Security model

What Fortress does with your pattern, what ends up on your phone’s storage, and where its protection stops. If anything here is unclear or looks wrong, write to us; we would rather fix the page than have you guess.

The short version

  • Your files are encrypted with AES-256-GCM, each under its own key, on your phone.
  • The key comes from your pattern, and it can only be rebuilt on your phone, because part of it lives in the phone’s security hardware.
  • Nothing you put in the vault is ever sent anywhere. There is no account and no server holding your data.
  • If you lose the pattern and the recovery phrase, or lose the phone, the vault is gone. Nobody can recover it.

What it protects against, and what it doesn’t

SituationWhat happensFortress
Someone knows your phone’s PIN or can use your face or fingerprintThey can open your phone, not Fortress. It has its own pattern.Protected
Someone copies the app’s files off the phoneThey get encrypted data. Guessing the pattern needs this phone’s security hardware, so it can’t be done on another computer.Protected
Someone tries to guess your pattern on the phoneAfter 5 misses they wait 30 seconds, rising to 15 minutes per attempt. Optional auto-wipe erases everything after a number of misses you choose.Protected
Your phone backs up to iCloud or GoogleThe vault is excluded from both, and from device-to-device transfer.Protected
Someone makes you open the vaultYou can open a decoy vault instead, or draw a duress pattern that erases everything. Neither can prove to them that nothing else exists.Partly
Someone watches you draw the patternThey can learn it. You can hide the line while drawing, which makes this harder but not impossible.Partly
Someone takes the phone while the vault is openThey see what you see until it locks. Shake to lock and face-down lock exist for exactly this moment.Partly
Your phone has malware with full control, or is rooted or jailbroken by someone elseNothing running on a compromised phone can promise to protect you, Fortress included.Not protected
The phone is lost, broken or resetThe vault is gone. There is no cloud copy, by design.Not protected

From pattern to key

Your pattern is never checked against anything. It is turned into a key, and a wrong pattern produces a key that opens nothing.

  1. Your pattern

    At least 7 dots on a 5×5 grid. Fortress never stores it, not even scrambled.

  2. Argon2id, mixed with a device secret

    64 MB of memory and 3 passes per attempt, keyed with a random secret held in the phone's keystore. Every guess is deliberately slow.

  3. The phone's hardware key

    On phones that have one, the result passes through a key inside the security chip (Secure Enclave on iPhone, Android Keystore). That key can’t be copied out, so guesses can only be tried on this phone.

  4. Opens 1 of 8 identical slots

    The key unwraps your vault’s random master key from a slot in the vault header. A wrong pattern opens nothing and reveals nothing.

  5. A separate key for every file

    The master key derives a different key for each photo, video, thumbnail and list of contents.

  6. AES-256-GCM, in sealed chunks

    Each file is encrypted in authenticated chunks. Change a single byte on disk and that chunk refuses to open.

you hold itonly this phone holds itencrypted

A pattern has far fewer possibilities than a long password, so its strength can’t come from the pattern alone. That’s why each attempt is bound to the phone. Argon2id makes every guess cost a lot of memory and time, and the phone’s hardware key means guesses can’t be moved to a faster machine: they have to be made on this phone, one at a time, through the app’s waiting periods.

Why a decoy can’t be spotted on disk

Fortress keeps 8 key slots in its header whether you use one vault or several. They all look alike.

What anyone copying the files sees

  1. Slot 1
  2. Slot 2
  3. Slot 3
  4. Slot 4
  5. Slot 5
  6. Slot 6
  7. Slot 7
  8. Slot 8

What is actually in them (one example)

  1. Random
  2. Your pattern
  3. Random
  4. Duress pattern
  5. Recovery phrase
  6. Random
  7. Decoy vault
  8. Random
Every slot is the same 60 bytes. Only drawing the right pattern, or entering the recovery phrase, reveals what one of them holds. Unused slots are filled with random bytes, so a phone with one vault and a phone with a decoy and a duress pattern look the same.

Drawing any pattern makes Fortress try every slot, every time, so the real vault, the decoy and the duress pattern all take the same steps and the same time. The duress slot holds an erase marker instead of a key, and is sealed exactly like the others, so it only reveals what it is when it’s opened.

Which slots belong to which vault is recorded only inside each vault’s own encrypted contents list, so the header can’t give it away.

What is stored on your phone

Everything Fortress writes lives in the app’s private storage, in a folder no other app can read. On iPhone it uses Apple’s strongest file protection class, which keeps the files encrypted by iOS whenever the phone is locked, and on top of that Fortress encrypts everything itself.

  • One header file with the 8 key slots described above.
  • Encrypted objects with random names: your photos, videos, files, notes, thumbnails and each vault’s list of contents. They are all the same kind of file, so the names and types don’t reveal what’s inside.

Every object is split into chunks, and each chunk is encrypted and authenticated with AES-256-GCM under a key made for that object alone. The list of contents is padded, so its size changes only in large steps as you add things.

What a copy of the files still shows: someone with the raw files can see roughly how much is stored, from the number and size of the encrypted objects. They can’t see what any of it is.

The recovery phrase

The 12-word phrase holds 128 bits of randomness, far more than any pattern. It opens its own key slot, which leads to the same vault.

Unlike the pattern, the phrase is deliberately not tied to the phone’s hardware, so recovery still works if the phone’s security chip or keystore is reset. That makes the phrase the most sensitive thing you own in Fortress. Keep it on paper, offline, and replace it in Settings if it may have been seen.

While the vault is open

  • The key is held only in the app’s memory, never in a file, and is wiped when the vault locks.
  • Decrypted thumbnails and opened files are held briefly and erased on lock.
  • Screenshots, screen recording and the app-switcher preview are blocked.
  • Leaving the app locks it immediately. On Android, the system cover hides it in the recent apps list.

What leaves your phone

Nothing from your vault. The app doesn’t contain analytics, advertising or crash-reporting code. It makes one kind of network request: a check for app updates, which sends the app version, platform and a random installation ID to our update provider. Purchases go through the App Store or Google Play. The privacy policy has the details.

What hasn’t happened yet

Fortress hasn’t been independently audited. Its design follows published, well-studied building blocks (AES-256-GCM, Argon2id, HKDF, the phones’ own hardware key stores) rather than anything invented for it, but an outside review is the honest next step, and when there is one its report will be linked here.

Found a problem? Write to [email protected] with “Security” in the subject. Please give us a chance to fix it before you publish.